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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the direct impact of corporate governance on firm 
value and its indirect impact using intellectual capital as the intervening variable and comparing the 
impact between Indonesia and Malaysia. Corporate governance is measured by managerial ownership, 
board size, and board composition. Intellectual capital is measured by value added intellectual 
coefficient. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q. This research is conducted upon consumer goods 
sector in Indonesia Stock Exchange and Bursa Malaysia during 2010-2015, with the total of 25 
companies or 150 firm-year (Indonesia) and 106 companies or 636 firm-year (Malaysia). Multiple 
regression analysis is used to examine the model. The findings demonstrate mixed results. Managerial 
ownership has a significant impact on intellectual capital and firm value in both countries, it is positive 
in Indonesia, but negative in Malaysia. Board size and board composition do not have any significant 
influence towards the intellectual capital in Indonesia, but it is significant in Malaysia. The impact of 
both variables is also significant on firm value for Indonesia, but only board size is significant in 
Malaysia. Intellectual capital shows no significant correlation with firm value in Indonesia while it is 
significant in Malaysia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of big corporation 
collapses, organizations around the world have 
been increasingly concerned about their 
corporate governance (CG) practice. In Asia, 
the interest in CG was triggered by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998, increasing the 
attention of Asian companies to reassess their 
weak CG practice (Cabalu, 2015). Although a 
number of initiatives have been taken, the 
reformation progress was uneven. In a survey 
conducted by the Asian Development Bank 
Institute (2004), 4 countries were identified as 
the worst victims of the crisis: Indonesia, 
Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia. However, after 
the crisis, Malaysia was ranked first as the 
country with the highest quality of CG while 
the other 3 countries had similar scores. Along 
with more recent survey that found similar 
results (ADB, 2016), it indicates that Malaysia 
has developed a much stronger CG practice 
than Indonesia. Generally, CG serves as a 
mechanism to monitor and control managers so 
that decisions are made for the best interest of 
the shareholders (Siagian et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, it is claimed that companies with 
better CG practice will have higher values 
(Arora & Sharma, 2016; Siagian et al., 2013). 
At the same time, with the rapid 
advancement of technology, the global 
economy has shifted from the traditional way of 
monitoring operations to the modern approach 
of value creation (Ting & Lean, 2009). 
Particularly, with the commencement of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
companies must be able to utilize their 
resources more effectively and efficiently in 
order to compete and create sustainable value 
(Pratama, 2016). Hence, the management of 
intellectual capital (IC) becomes critical in 
today’s knowledge-based economy. 
IC is the knowledge within an organization 
which is able to create value when it is utilized 
in line with the mission, vision, and goals of the 
organization (APICC, 2017). It is considered as 
a strategic resource that is vital in creating 
sustainable growth (Zeghal & Maaloul, 2010). 
According to Keenan and Aggestam (2001), 
CG is responsible for creating, developing, and 
leveraging IC. This paper focuses on the board 
of directors as it is the main organ of CG system 
that is capable of improving the performance of 
the company (Chahal & Kumari, 2013). The 
board’s active involvement in setting objectives 
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and participation in strategic plans make it 
crucial to provide competitive advantages, 
create value, and serve as the sources of IC 
(Berezinets et al., 2016). 
The consumer goods sector in the 
manufacturing industry has been chosen as the 
object of the study. The manufacturing industry 
of both Indonesia and Malaysia are among the 
largest contributors to their respective economy 
(BPS, 2017; DOSM, 2017).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
The social, economic, and political 
environment in Indonesia were heavily 
damaged by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
1998. However, the event is a stepping stone for 
the CG initiatives in the country. A national 
committee on CG (NCG) was established in 
1999 and they issued the first Indonesia’s Code 
of CG in 2001 before it was revised in the latest 
2006 version (International Finance 
Corporation Advisory Services in Indonesia, 
2014). Limited liability companies in Indonesia 
adopt the two-tier board system where there is 
a supervisory board, called the board of 
commissioners (BOC), sitting between 
shareholders and the board of directors (BOD). 
BOC is responsible for overseeing and 
providing advice to BOD while the BOD is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the company (International Finance 
Corporation Advisory Services in Indonesia, 
2014). 
Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
Malaysia is more advanced in its corporate 
regulatory environment even before the Asian 
financial crisis hit them in 1997-1998. Among 
other regulations, listed companies are already 
required to have independent directors on their 
boards (Cabalu, 2015). However, CG attracted, 
even more, attention after the crisis. Malaysian 
companies adopt the unitary or one-tier board 
system where there is only one board, called the 
BOD, that is responsible for both management 
oversight and performance evaluation roles 
(Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012). 
Managerial Ownership 
According to agency theory, managerial 
ownership (BOWN) works as a direct incentive 
for managers to act in line with shareholders’ 
interest (Kamardin & Haron, 2011). By holding 
portions of the company’s ownership, 
managers will put a focus on the long-term 
value of the company and make an investment 
that enhances the long-term value, such as IC 
investments (Saleh et al., 2009). Therefore, a 
greater percentage of stocks owned by the 
managers will help align the interests of 
managers and that of the shareholders. 
Managerial ownership is measured by the ratio 
of shares owned by the board to total 
outstanding ordinary shares (Kamardin & 
Haron, 2011; Noradiva et al., 2016; Saleh et al., 
2009). 
Board Size (BS) 
Agency theorists argue that smaller boards 
are more effective. The larger board has been 
said as having communication and coordination 
problems, hence, unable to properly control the 
management (Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). As 
the size increases, it may also be difficult to 
reach timely decisions because of slower 
proceedings (Kamardin & Haron, 2011). In 
contrast, other literature suggests that larger 
boards provide the company with more 
diversity and larger pool of expertise 
(Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). More people in 
the board means better allocation of 
responsibilities so that they can effectively 
monitor managers. In addition, a larger board 
provides more links to the external environment 
which improves the company’s access to an 
array of resources, such as IC, that eventually 
improves its performance (Jackling & Johl, 
2009).  
Board Composition  
Board composition (BCOMP) refers to the 
proportion of independent directors on the 
board. According to agency theory, 
independent directors help enhance the 
effectiveness of monitoring and control over 
management (Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015). 
They also have diverse roles and a multitude of 
resources that help execute strategy and 
evaluate managers’ decisions. In contrast, the 
stewardship theorists argue that greater 
proportion of independent directors is not 
preferable. It is the non-independent directors 
who influence the company’s performance with 
a better understanding of the business and 
superior decisions (Gaur et al., 2015).  
Intellectual Capital (IC) 
The resource-based theory explains that 
only resources which are valuable, rare, non-
substitutable and hard-to-imitate would provide 
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a sustainable competitive advantage and 
superior performance to the company 
(Kozlenkova et al., 2013). IC has been said as 
the only resource that corresponds to the 
resource-based theory as it is the core of value 
creation and competitive advantage (Pratama, 
2016). Although IC definitions vary, all of them 
emphasize on its growing importance as 
knowledge-based capital and its link with value 
creation. 
The Value Added Intellectual Capital 
(VAIC) model was first developed by Pulic in 
1998. The concept of VAIC is in relation to the 
corporate intellectual ability that refers to the 
efficiency of total value creation created by two 
resources (IC and physical resources) that work 
simultaneously in a business environment 
(Pulic, 2004). VAIC offers a relatively simple 
quantitative approach based on financial 
statements which are publicly available and 
derived from an identifiable source. Below are 
the steps to calculate VAIC: 
1. Value Added (VA) = 𝑂𝑃 + 𝐸𝐶 + 𝐷𝑃 + 𝐴 
Where OP is operating profit, EC is total 
employee expense, DP is depreciation, A is 
amortization. 
2. Human Capital Efficiency(HCE)= VA/HC 
Where HC is human cost or total salaries 
and wages. 
3. Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) = 
SC/VA 
Where SC is structural capital or value 
added minus human cost. 
4. Intellectual Capital Efficiency (ICE) = 
HCE+CEE 
5. Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) = 
VA/CE 
Where CE is capital employed. 
6. Value Added Intellectual Coefficient 
(VAIC) = ICE + CEE  
 
Firm Value 
Due to the limitations of VAIC, the research 
attempts to link it the company’s value. Firm 
value is a long-term measure of performance as 
it is reflected in the share price of the company 
in the market. Generally, high firm value 
provides confidence to investors regarding the 
current performance and future growth of the 
company. One measurement of firm value is 
Tobin’s Q. Compared to accounting profit rate, 
Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking tool that reflects 
investors’ valuation for the corporate 
opportunity. It has been argued as a good 
indicator of firm value where higher Q value 
represents the competitive advantage for the 
company. Below is the formula to calculate 
Tobin’s Q (TBQ): 
𝑇𝐵𝑄 =
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝑃𝑆 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝐴
 
Where MVE is the market value of equity or 
stock closing price at year end × the number of 
outstanding shares, PS is preferred stock, TA is 
book value of total assets. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research will perform analysis on the 
independent (managerial ownership, board 
size, board composition as independent 
variables), intervening (IC), and dependent 
(Firm value) variables. Firm size, leverage, 
return on asset as control variables. 
The data used in this research is secondary 
data retrieved mainly from annual reports, 
Bloomberg, and Yahoo Finance. The 
population are consumer goods companies in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and Bursa 
Malaysia in 2010-2015 with total of 38 and 
123. Using purposive sampling, four criteria are 
established to determine the sample: 1) Listed 
in consumer goods in IDX or Bursa Malaysia, 
2) Have initial public offering before 2010, 3) 
Publish complete annual report 2010-2015, 4) 
Have its share price in Yahoo Finance. After 
elimination, the companies are 25 (Indonesia) 
and 106 (Malaysia), hence, 150 firm-year and 
636 firm-year. After data testing and trimming, 
the observations become 127 firm-year 
(Indonesia) and 328 firm-year (Malaysia). 
 
Research Model 
Multiple Linear Regression with intervening 
variable is conducted using the model below.  
 
Figure 1. Model Analysis 
 
𝑉𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉 +
𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀  
𝑇𝐵𝑄 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽4𝑉𝐴𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +
𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀  
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For Indonesia, the calculation for each CG 
variable is separated between the BOD and 
BOC (i.e. BMOWN is separated into 
BODMOWN and BOCMOWN). 
 
RESULTS 
The T-test results can be seen in Table 3. 
For the adjusted R2, Table 1 shows that 
Indonesia are 66.9% and 87.3% while Malaysia 
are 62.3% and 31.5%. The F-test of both 
models in both sample is 0.000. 
Table 1. Adjusted R2 and F-test 
 
 
It can be seen in Table 3 that for Indonesia 
sample, VAIC fails as a mediator of the 
relationship between CG and TBQ as its 
significance level is 0.125. Table 2 depicts the 
direct and indirect impact for Malaysia. Since 
the indirect impact produces smaller number, 
VAIC is not effective as a mediator between 
BMOWN to TBQ. On the other hand, VAIC 
unable to mediate BSIZE to TBQ as the direct 
and indirect impact shows different direction 
(i.e. positive and negative). 
 
Table 2. Direct and Indirect Impact 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Based on the regression results in Table 4, 
below are each hypothesis explanation. 
1. For Indonesia, H1a is accepted particularly 
for BOD as it is positive to VAIC. 
Although Indonesia directors generally 
hold only less than 2% shareholdings (see 
Table 3), the result proves that it can be an 
incentive for directors to act in line with the 
shareholders’ interests (Noradiva et al., 
2016) by taking long-term value-enhancing 
projects, such as investment in IC (Saleh et 
al., 2009). On the other hand, although 
Malaysia directors hold larger ownerships 
(12.39%), it seems to not motivate them, 
hence, H1a is rejected. In Malaysia, board 
ownership is not the only factor that 
determines the board’s competency. This is 
confirmed by Saleh et al. (2009) who said 
that Malaysia directors are more highly 
rewarded in the form of perquisites and 
allowances. 
2. H1b is rejected for Indonesia and Malaysia 
as BODSIZE and BOCSIZE are not 
significant while BSIZE is negative to 
VAIC. Overall, the results do not support 
that larger boards should enable companies 
to secure IC resources. On average, 
Malaysia (7) has larger boards compared to 
Indonesia (5 and 4). However, due to the 
fact that candidates are often searched and 
recommended by the executive directors or 
major shareholders themselves (Annuar & 
Rashid, 2015), it explains why these 
directors, although many, are not 
necessarily fit nor add value, hence, makes 
communication and decision-making 
problem that results in decreased ability to 
make IC investments (Al-Musali & Ismail, 
2012; Annuar & Rashid, 2015; Appuhami 
& Bhuyan, 2015). On the other hand, in 
Indonesia, board size seems to be merely 
the number of board members, and this 
might not have any correlation with the 
skills and ability to perform their jobs. A 
survey by OECD (2017) revealed that not 
all Indonesian companies are required to 
conduct a fit and proper test and continuous 
training for directors. This indicates that 
not all directors on the board have the 
necessary skills that enable the companies 
to manage IC effectively. H1c is rejected 
for Indonesia and Malaysia as BODCOMP 
and BOCCOMP are not significant while 
BCOMP is negative to VAIC. Overall, the 
results contradict with the agency theory. It 
seems that because independent directors 
do not work full-time, they have inadequate 
knowledge about the company and devote 
less time to improve its value through IC 
(Yammeesri & Herath, 2010). It was also 
ID MY ID MY
VAIC 0.669 0.623 0.000 0.000
TBQ 0.873 0.315 0.000 0.000
Regression Model
Adjusted R² Sig. F
Indirect Impact
(Through VAIC)
BMOWN --> TBQ -0.216 (Sig)
-0.069 (Sig) × 0.340 
(Sig) = -0.0235
BSIZE --> TBQ 0.298 (Sig)
-0.113 (Sig) × 0.340 
(Sig) = -0.0384
Relationship
Direct 
Impact
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
BODMOWN 0.000 0.230 0.019 0.058
BOCMOWN 0.000 0.130 0.006 0.025
BODSIZE 2.000 15.000 5.276 2.439
BOCSIZE 2.000 8.000 4.221 1.527
BODCOMP 0.000 0.540 0.096 0.141
BOCCOMP 0.200 0.800 0.391 0.103
VAIC 0.820 10.190 4.107 2.108 0.370 4.740 2.521 0.738
TBQ 0.240 15.690 2.877 3.183 0.230 1.120 0.651 0.198
FSIZE 10.940 13.800 12.222 0.693 7.440 10.260 8.346 0.482
LEV 0.000 0.560 0.180 0.160 0.000 0.650 0.189 0.155
ROA 0.000 0.460 0.114 0.117 -0.140 0.220 0.042 0.053
0.114
Variable
11.000
0.750
3.000 7.220 1.690
0.270 0.441
Indonesia: N = 127 Malaysia: N = 328
0.000 0.450 0.124 0.131
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noted by some studies that Asian 
companies typically choose their 
independent directors base on kinship 
(Basyith, 2016; Yammeesri & Herath, 
2010) due to the high influence of family- 
owned groups (OECD, 2017). Hence, they 
are not able to properly fulfill their 
responsibilities to manage IC effectively. 
3. For Indonesia, H2a is accepted particularly 
for BOD as it is positive to TBQ. The result 
supports the agency theory where 
managerial ownership is able to increase 
the value of the company as managers have 
vested interest in the company. In contrast, 
for Malaysia, BMOWN has a negative β 
score and a significance level of 0.000 to 
TBQ. Thus, H2a is rejected. This might be 
due to the low average shareholdings held 
by the board (see Table 3). It is consistent 
with the findings of Amran and Ahmad 
(2013) in a study of Malaysian companies, 
who found an inverted U-shaped 
relationship where at ownership level < 
27%, the correlation is negative as the 
boards have greater incentive to pursue 
personal benefits rather than maximizing 
the firm value. 
4. H2b is accepted in Indonesia (particularly 
for BOD) and Malaysia. Overall, the results 
support the argument that larger boards can 
provide more expertise and wider links to 
external environment which are viewed as 
more effective by the market to manage the 
company’s resources (Appuhami & 
Bhuyan, 2015; Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
5. For Indonesia, H2c is accepted particularly 
for BOC as it is positive to TBQ. This result 
supports the agency theory which mentions 
that independent directors are necessary to 
mitigate agency problems (Appuhami & 
Bhuyan, 2015). Moreover, they help 
increase the transparency of the company’s 
affairs and provide more assurance to 
investors (Kumar & Singh, 2012). On the 
other hand, for Malaysia, BCOMP is not 
significant to TBQ. Thus, H2c is rejected. 
Most independent directors in Malaysia are 
selected for political reasons and legitimate 
business activities (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). Consequently, the lack of awareness 
of their responsibilities unable them to 
bring any significant impact to improve the 
firm value (Arora & Sharma, 2016). In 
addition, Annuar and Rashid (2015) 
discovered that the role of independent 
directors in Malaysia is more about steering 
the company forward, but it is the 
management who are responsible for 
making things happen.  
6. For Indonesia, VAIC is not significant to 
TBQ, thus, H3 is rejected. For Malaysia, 
H3 is accepted as VAIC is positive to TBQ. 
In the case of Malaysia, IC is proven to be 
capable of enhancing the competitive 
advantage by governing knowledge, 
technique, and skills that help companies 
gain sustainable profits (Wang, 2008). 
Having superior IC will increase the 
investors’ confidence, hence, increasing 
the firm value. However, IC in Indonesia 
does not influence the firm value. This 
might be because the innovation and 
competitiveness indexes in Indonesia are 
relatively lower compared to Malaysia 
(World Economic Forum, 2016). Hence, it 
may not form the best environment for the 
development of IC in the country 
(Maditinos et al., 2011). 
 
Table 4. Regression Results 
 
For the control variables, firm size, 
leverage, and ROA are all positive towards IC 
in both countries. However, all are not 
significant towards TBQ in the case of 
Malaysia while, in Indonesia, only firm size is 
not significant towards TBQ. It means that size 
is not a deciding factor for firm value. Leverage 
is irrelevant towards firm value in Malaysia 
because a company with good projects will 
thrive regardless of its capital structure 
(Osazuwa & Che-Ahmad, 2016). Lastly, ROA 
is irrelevant towards firm value in Malaysia as 
the investors are more interested in the 
β t Sig. t β t Sig. t
BODMOWN 0.143 2.582 0.011*
BOCMOWN -0.02 -0.211 0.834
BODSIZE -0 -0.040 0.968
BOCSIZE 0.108 1.548 0.124
BODCOMP -0.01 -0.118 0.906
BOCCOMP 0.036 0.545 0.587
FSIZE 0.281 3.458 0.001* 0.201 5.206 0.000*
LEV 0.241 3.877 0.000* 0.217 5.593 0.000*
ROA 0.701 9.815 0.000* 0.788 19.91 0.000*
BODMOWN 0.079 2.253 0.026*
BOCMOWN -0.17 -2.683 0.008*
BODSIZE 0.143 2.169 0.032*
BOCSIZE -0.05 -1.179 0.241
BODCOMP 0.062 1.563 0.121
BOCCOMP 0.107 2.609 0.010*
VAIC -0.09 -1.546 0.125 0.340 4.541 0.000*
FSIZE 0.059 1.112 0.268 0.019 0.351 0.726
LEV 0.085 2.085 0.039* -0.056 -1.028 0.305
ROA 0.965 16.19 0.000* -0.008 -0.105 0.916
Regression 
Model
Independent 
Variable
Dependent 
Variable
0.298 5.477 0.000*
0.059 1.175 0.241
-2.834 0.005*
-0.064 -1.736 0.083**
-0.216 -4.465 0.000*
Malaysia's Results
-0.069 -1.941 0.053**
-0.113
1 VAIC
2 TBQ
Note: ** and * significant at the 0.1 and 0.05 respectively.
Indonesia's Results
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company’s ability to generate cash and 
dividends in their investment decisions (Chong 
& Lai, 2011). 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
From the analysis, it can be concluded that 
there are mixed results in relation to the 
relationship between selected CG indicators, 
IC, and firm value. Overall, managerial 
ownership (i.e. shares owned by board 
members) is a good incentive to improve IC and 
firm value in Indonesia while it is the opposite 
in Malaysia. Board size turns out to be not 
correlated with IC in Indonesia but negative in 
Malaysia. However, its impact on firm value is 
positive in both countries. Board composition 
shows no correlation with IC but significantly 
improves firm value in Indonesia. In Malaysia, 
board composition significantly decreases the 
IC but it shows no influence on firm value. 
Lastly, IC shows no influence on firm value in 
Indonesia but it significantly improves firm 
value in Malaysia.  
Future research can consider including 
more sectors in the sample to give a bigger 
picture regarding the topic. Other CG indicators 
that gradually gain popularity and importance 
(such as board skills and diversity) could be 
also added. Finally, due to the limitations of 
VAIC, future research can utilize other 
measures of IC to generate more valuable 
conclusions. 
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